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A new critique weighs in, as tends to happen every twenty years
or so.' Because of the long interval, there is little institutional
memory-hardly anyone recalls what happened last time, when the
Realists consigned mechanical jurisprudence to oblivion, 2 for
example, or when law and society dispatched the comfortable beliefs
of 1950s-style law-and-policy. Even cls's attack on neutral princi-
ples and legal process is now some fifteen years old;4 few remem-
ber the difficult times the movement experienced in its early years.
5
Now we have the critique of normativity, raising questions about
our scholarship, teaching, and indeed our very self-concepts as
lawyers and writers.6 Audacious critics are saying that normativos
have nowhere to go,7 that much of our most cherished discourse
is empty, pointless, and self-referential. 8 Writers are implying that
the priesthood is the last refuge for lost souls displaced by earlier
reforms.
9
The critique, then, is here. What will happen? The returns are
not in. Butjudging from some comments we have received and the
one reply article included in this issue, 10 it seems a good bet that
t Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974,
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1 For the opinion that this interval is shortening, however, see Schlag, Normative
and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 167 (1990).
2 The term is from Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908)
[hereinafter Pound, Mechanical]. See also Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Pound, The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).
3 See Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 575 (1984) (placing law-and-society movement within Critical mainstream).
4 For a history of the movement, see Schlegel, Notes Toward An Intimate,
Opinionated, and Affectionate Histoty of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 391 (1984).
5 See, e.g., Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984)
(describing the movement as anti-law, corrosive, and inviting its members to depart
the law school).
6 See The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991); see also Schlag,
supra note 1.
7 See Schlag, supra note 1.
8 See id. at 170-71, 18083; Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 801, 834-52 (1991).
9 See Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal
Thought 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 935-38, 953-55 (1991).10 See Radin & Michelman, Pragmatists and Poststructural Critical Legal Practice, 139
(1071)
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responses will take the following forms. In fact, if Pierre Schlag is
right about normativity's inscription in our thought and culture,
1 1
such responses are inevitable, programmed, as certain to come as
the swallows' return to Capistrano.
Move number one. The first move is to portray the new critique
as self-contradictory. How can you be urging a retreat from
normativity?12 That is itself a normative stand-you wouldn't be
urging it unless you thought it was a good thing, unless you believed
there is something wrong about normative scholarship and
practice. 13 You are normativos yourselves-which just shows how
impossible it is to dispense with normativity; your very argument
refutes itself.
Comment. But the response also proves our point-that norma-
tivity is so deeply inscribed that we cannot even begin to think of a
new intellectual contribution except in terms of taking sides, being
for or against something, praising this value or condemning that
one. 4 And besides, there is something d6j vu in the claim that
our arguments are self-cannibalizing.15  Imagine the following
dialogue between a young Legal Realist and a mechanical juris-
prude:'
6
Scene: The faculty lounge. Date: Any time in the early
1900s.
Mechanicaljurisprude: So you and your friends are attacking
us for being "mechanical" and holding that law consists of
drawing conclusions from premises consisting of rules of law
and the facts of particular cases.
Young Realist: We've showed that this is so-law cannot be
simply a matter of deductive logic. There is much more to
it than that, and we can prove it-and in fact have done
so.
1 7
U. PA. L. REV. 1019 (1991).
11 See Schlag, supra note 1, at 174-76, 180-87.
12 See Radin & Michelman, supra note 10, at 1021-22 (raising question whether
Schlag is not guilty of a performative contradiction).
I3 See id. at 1021-22, 1055-56.
14 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
15 See Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses ofthe Legal Distinction,
40 STAN. L. REv. 929 (1988). Literal-that is, physical-self-cannibalism should
obviously remain limited to inessential parts (like hangnails). Psychotherapy and
critique, however, show that in the mental realm, many items of our repertoire are
better jettisoned.
16 See Pound, Mechanical supre; note 2. The Realists criticized the formalists as
holding a crabbed, conceptually narrow, and impossibly mechanical view of law.
17 For examples of the devastating attack mounted by the Realists on the
MOVES
Mechanicaljurisprude: We needn't get into that. Let me just
ask you one question: Is your attack on us logical or
illogical? If illogical, why should anyone pay attention to it?
And if logical, you've just proved our point-that law and
legal analysis must be logical. You refute your own posi-
tion-you're snared in a self-contradiction.
Today, we can all see what is wrong with the formalist's
response. But my guess is that few did at the time.18 There is
nothing self-contradictory about using a tool to dismantle a
structure and then using a different tool to build a better one.
There is nothing wrong with abandoning a ladder after having used
it to climb to a point where one is no longer necessary.
Move number two. The second move finds a strain or contradic-
tion, not within the new critique itself, but between it and the old
order, or some presupposition intrinsic to it. Radin and Michel-
man, for example, find the critique of normativity inconsistent with
our current understanding of agency19 and the role of lan-
guage 20 The critique must therefore be wrong.
Comment. Every paradigm change will look wrong to those
caught up in the old regime. 2 1 To say the new approach contra-
dicts our current understanding about X Y, or Z is to fail to take the
critique seriously-i.e., on its own terms. Paradigms change when
everyone realizes the new paradigm is simpler, cleaner, and more
liberating than the old one-and that these advantages outweigh the
costs of abandoning old assumptions (like X Y, and Z).22
Move number three. The third move charges the critics with
nihilism. The commentator cannot imagine what would replace the
old regime, believes that the critic cannot either, and dismisses the
critic's few, sketchy positive suggestions as Utopian or unworthy of
formalists and Langdellians, see sources cited supra note 2.
18 See generally Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell The Same Stories?: Law Reform.
Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REv. 207 (1989)
(concerning the predicament of a law reformer attempting to craft, or even envision,
new legal approaches).
19 See Radin & Michelman, supra note 10, at 1058.
20 See id. at 1027 (casting doubt on critique because it contradicts current
"understandings of language, knowledge ... and their interconnections").
21 For a classic treatment of this practice, from a leading sociologist ofknowledge,
see T. KuHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCiENTInC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
22 According to Kuhn, scholars in a discipline will cling to the old paradigm until
the costs of doing so exceed the costs of transition to the new one. See id.
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serious consideration.2" The structure of this move is: The
critique would destroy all that I hold dear. Therefore, it is wrong.
Comment. Sometimes holy things are wrong. Sometimes nothing
is better than something-it all depends on what that something is.
Sometimes it will turn out that there was nothing there in the first
place. At one point in our history, scientists believed in the ether,
refusing to believe that space could be empty. Those who first
attacked this belief were told that their ideas were preposterous,
nihilist, irresponsible-there must be something out there. 24 Were
the early Legal Realists and Grits nihilists? Of course not. Today
we see that they have a rich program of their own. But their early
critics saw them in those terms; today very few do.
Move number four. The fourth move accuses the critic of
essentializing. There is not one normativity, but rather many
normativities. 25 What we say about one may not hold true of the
others. A fault with, say, law and economics may not hold true for
communitarianism, and so on.
Comment. What this move ignores is that just as the critique may
not hold true for all varieties of normativism, it may also hold true
for all or most of them. Imagine an early formalist making the same
reply to a Realist (i.e., "There are many mechanical jurisprudences,
not one")-or someone defending a disease-say measles-on the
ground that not all forms of it are as serious as others. There may
be many normativities, but they all may be subject to one or more
variants of the critique. One should not dismiss a critique merely
because it sweeps in a variety of targets-indeed one could argue
that a critique gains power to the extent that it holds true in a
variety of cases.
Move number five. Move number five refuses to believe that we
could possibly be urging that there is something systemically
troubling about normative-talk. You must be criticizing just this
value or that. You must be urging us to reshuffle our set of norms,
23 See Radin & Michelman, supra note 10, at 1055-56 (warning of the vacuum that
would result if normativity were jettisoned).
24 For discussion of scientific change and scientists' resistance to it, see J.G.
KEMENY, A PHILOSOPHER LooKs AT SCIENCE (1959); T. KUHN, supra note 21
(contending that paradigms supplant each other only when "normal science" becomes
so conflict-ridden and unable to explain experimental results that costs of status quo
exceed those of working toward new paradigm).
25 See Radin & Michelman, supra note 10, at 1023 (contending that there is "not
one... but many normativities").
MOVES
replacing efficiency, say, with the Rawlsian difference principle, or
some other value with yet another, favorite one.
26
Comment. Wrong. The Realists were not urging that we replace
Aristotelian logic with Boolean algebra or some other, more
sophisticated, form of law-as-logic. They were insisting that law
cannot be seen as logic at all-that simply was not a plausible
understanding of legaljudgment. Their critique was not piecemeal,
but broad and general. So is ours. We have no favorite, hidden
value we are waiting to spring on unsuspecting readers once we
have cleared away the competition. We want to start an entirely
new way of looking at law as a discipline.
Move number six. The sixth move is co-optation. Of course there
are problems with normativity, excesses, bad uses of it, and so on.
We have been saying this all along. Join the crowd.27
Comment. Good. We are glad to acknowledge intellectual
forerunners-we have named some28-and fellow travelers. But
note our passages about retraining.29 You are not free of the
normative habit until you no longer long for the high you get from
cheerleading with a like-minded normativo, like a spectator at an
athletic event. There is no such thing as the selective critique of
normativity. All views that see law and legal scholarship as
inherently, basically, fundamentally normative must be reconsid-
ered.
30  I
Move number seven. But then, what will (should) we do?
Comment. You are re-inscribing yourself again. Try our variety
of it: Cycle back to page 801.31
26 See id. at 1055-56.
27 See id. at 1019-20 (agreeing, in part, with critique).
28 See Delgado, supra note 9, at 934 n.4.
2 See id. at 959-62.
30 See id.; Schlag, supra note 1.
S See The Critique of Normativity, supra note 6.
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